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Abstract:  We analyse benefit-entitlement effects and the likely impact of the recent reform of the 
unemployment compensation system on the duration of unemployment in Germany on the basis of a 
flexible discrete-time hazard rate model estimated on pre-reform data from the German Socioeconomic 
Panel (SOEP). We find (i) relatively strong benefit-entitlement effects for the unemployed who are 
eligible to means-tested unemployment assistance after the exhaustion of unemployment benefit, but 
not for those without such entitlement; (ii) non-monotonic benefit-entitlement effects on hazard rates 
with pronounce spikes around the month of benefit-exhaustion, and (iii) relatively small marginal 
effects of the amount of unemployment compensation on the duration of unemployment. OUr 
simulation results show that the recent labour market reform is unlikely to have a major impact on the 
average duration of unemployment in the population as a whole, but will significantly reduce the level 
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1 Introduction 
Benefit-entitlement effects of unemployment insurance on the duration of unemployment have been the 
subject of much theoretical and empirical analysis in labour and public economics (for surveys see, 
e.g., Atkinson and Micklewright 1991, Krueger and Meyer 2002: 2334-2354). Both microeconomic 
models of individual labour supply and the theory of optimal job search imply that a more generous 
unemployment compensation system will increase the duration of unemployment (see, e.g., Moffitt and 
Nicholson  1982, Mortensen 1977, 1986). The economic rationale for this prediction is simple: 
Unemployment benefits act as a search subsidy, thus reducing the cost of leisure or increasing the 
reservation wage thereby inducing the unemployed to search longer for a job. More specifically, as 
shown by Mortensen (1977), the simple job-search model implies that the hazard rate from 
unemployment is continuously increasing as the remaining duration of benefit-entitlement decreases 
until the benefit-exhaustion point is reached, and remains constant thereafter.  
Although these models are somewhat restrictive regarding their focus on the supply side of the 
labor market, they have widely been used as a theoretical basis for the empirical analysis of benefit-
entitlement effects on the duration of unemployment behavior (see, e.g., Meyer 1990, Katz and Meyer 
1990). For Germany, benefit-entitlement effects also have been analysed in several previous empirical 
studies (e.g., Hunt 1995, Hujer and Schneider 1996, Steiner 1997, Wolff 2003, Fitzenberger and 
Wilke 2004). These studies used the successive extension of unemployment benefit entitlement periods 
that took place in the 1980s to estimate the effect of these changes on the duration of unemployment. 
Estimating simple hazard rate models, these studies established some evidence that the extension of 
benefit-entitlement periods increased the duration of unemployment, especially among the older 
unemployed for whom the extension of maximum entitlement was most pronounced (see section 2). 
Some of these studies also found that, compared to these entitlement effects, the effects of marginal 
changes in the income replacement ratio, i.e. the share of (previous) net earnings replaced by the 
amount of unemployment compensation, on the duration of unemployment are quite small.  
All the studies mentioned above refer to the period before the recent major reform of the German 
unemployment compensation system, which partly was a reaction to the perceived disincentive 
problems related to two features of the previous fairly generous system: First, the rather long maximum 
unemployment benefit entitlement periods especially for older workers and, secondly, the generally 
unlimited eligibility for means-tested unemployment assistance after the expiration of the entitlement to 
Unemployment Benefit. Both of these regulations were changed by the recent reform, and the new 
rules became effective in 2005 and 2006, respectively. In particular, maximum entitlement periods for   2
unemployment benefits were cut, especially for the older unemployed, and Unemployment Assistance 
was changed into Unemployment Benefit II. This implied a tighter means test and, depending on 
previous earnings, may result in a reduced level of benefits.  
Since this reform has only recently become effective, its likely effects on the duration of 
unemployment in Germany can only be assessed based on an ex-ante evaluation. Christensen (2005) 
examines potential effects of the reform on the duration of unemployment by simulating reservation 
wages on the basis of a non-stationary job search model for a couple of stylised households differently 
affected by the reform under various simplifying assumptions. Calibrating the model to an empirically 
estimated reservation wage elasticity of the hazard rate to employment of 2 % assumed the same for all 
groups, his simulations indicate that the reform will reduce unemployment by 200,000 to 250,000 
persons. One limitation of this approach is that it does not adequately account for the fact that the 
effects of the analysed reform vary substantially across individuals, even for claimants with the same 
age and the same previous earnings. Another limitation is the rather restrictive model specification 
regarding benefit-entitlement effects on the hazard rate from unemployment.  
The aim of our paper is to empirically assess the importance of benefit-entitlement effects and the 
likely impact of the mentioned recent reform on the duration of unemployment. For this purpose, we 
specify a flexible hazard rate model and estimate it on pre-reform data. In the next section, we provide 
some information on the German unemployment compensation system and the recent reform 
mentioned above. The empirical model is described in section 3, estimation results are presented and 
discussed in section 4. These are then used in section 5 to simulate the effects of the recent reform on 
the completed duration of unemployment, and on long-term unemployment in particular.  Our main 
results are summarised in section 6, which also concludes.  
 
2  The German Unemployment Compensation System – Structure and Recent 
Reforms 
Until the recent reforms of the German unemployment compensation system there were two types of 
unemployment benefits. Unemployment Benefit (UB, “Arbeitslosengeld”), which is funded by 
contributions of employers and jobholders, and Unemployment Assistance (UA, “Arbeitslosenhilfe”), 
which is funded from government revenues. While the former was granted for a certain number of 
months depending on the age and the length of an individual’s previous contribution period, the latter 
was generally granted as long as the means test was passed.    3
To be eligible for UB, a number of conditions have to be fulfilled: One has to be registered as 
unemployed at the local labour office, be not older than 65 years and available for work on short notice 
and prepared to accept “suitable” job offers. Unemployed people aged 58 years or older who formally 
agreed to retire at the age of 60 years could receive the UB without being registered as searching for 
work. Employees who quit their job or did not accept suitable job offers could be sanctioned up to a 
length of 12 weeks. Until the recent reform, the maximum UB entitlement period depended on the 
number of months worked in the last seven years and the age of the claimant. Unemployed people 
younger than 42 years were only entitled to a maximum duration of 12 months, people younger than 44 
to a length of 18 months, and so on (see Table 1). The longest possible duration was 32 months for 
people older than 54 years, who had worked at least 64 months in the last seven years. In April 1997 
the Employment Promotion Act increased the age limits by three years and reduced the maximum 
entitlement length for the most people older than 42. Those who became unemployed after April 1997 
but had worked at least 12 months out of the last three years prior to the spell before April 1997 were 
entitled to UB according to the old regulation 
 
Table 1  Changes in unemployment benefit entitlement periods over time by age and previous work 
experience 

























6  -  12  6  -  12  6  -  12 
8  -  16  8  -  16  8  -  16 
10  -  20  10  -  20  10  -  20 
12  -  24  12  -  24  12  -  24 
14  42  28  14  45  28       
16  42  32  16  45  32  15  55  30 
18  42  36  18  45  36  18  55  36 
20  44  40  20  47  40       
22  44  44  22  47  44       
24  49  48  24  52  48       
26  49  52  26  52  52       
28  54  56  28  57  56       
30  54  60  30  57  60       
32  54  64  32  57  64       
Source: Adapted from Wolff (2003), own extensions 
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The recent reform which became effective in February 2006 tightened the criteria to eligibility for 
ALG. Now, to become eligible for UB one has to have worked for at least 12 months in the last two 
years (instead of three years). The maximum entitlement period depends on the number of months 
worked in the last three years (instead of seven). Also the age limit was increased again; from now on 
only individuals older than 55 years are possibly entitled to UB for more than 12 months. But even for 
this group the maximum length of entitlement decreased and is now 18 months. 
For unemployed people who already received UB in the last seven years (the last three years 
since February 2006) the period between the last and the new unemployment spell determines the 
entitlement length. The number of months worked in this shorter period divided by two yields the 
potential duration of UB receipt. Potential remaining months of UB entitlement from the last spell are 
added. Again the sum is limited by the maximum duration which is determined by the age of the 
individual (see Table 1). The amount of UB depends on the earnings in the former job. Individuals with 
children receive 67% of their former net income, individuals without children get 60%. The income-
replacement rate did not change since 1995. 
Until January 2005, people who were not eligible for UB could receive UA if they passed a 
means test that also included the income of other household members. It could either be received from 
the beginning of the unemployment spell (if people were not entitled to UB because of their work-
history) or after the claimant had exhausted his UB benefits. In principle, it was not time-limited but 
initially only granted for a year and then prolonged every year if another means test was passed and the 
claimant was younger than 65 years. The replacement ratio was 57% (53% without children) of the 
former net earnings. 
In January 2005, UA was integrated with Social Assistance to become Unemployment Benefit II 
which remains to be means-tested and principally granted indefinitely. However, the amount does not 
depend on the former net income of the unemployed individual anymore, but on the legally defined 
social minimum of the household which depends on the number and age of the household members and 
includes costs for renting and heating costs up to certain amounts.  
   5
3 Empirical  Model 
3.1 Hazard  Rate  Specification 
We model the transition from unemployment to, respectively, employment and out-of-the-labour-force 
using a discrete-time hazard rate approach.
1 We use a discrete-time hazard rate model because the 
duration of unemployment and benefit receipt are coded on a monthly basis in our data (see section 
3.2). The specification of the hazard rate model follows Steiner (2001), although the focus here is on 
the effects of regulations concerning unemployment compensation on the hazard rate from 
unemployment.  
Let Tik denote the length of the k
th unemployment spell of individual i and be assumed to be a 
discrete non-negative random variable. It takes on the value t if the unemployment spell ends in 
interval [It-1,It) by one of the two exit states. The hazard rate,  ( ) t
k
ij λ , is the conditional probability of 
transition from unemployment to the exit state j in interval t, given the individual has been unemployed 
until the beginning of this interval. 
 (1)  () () () , , , () ,
km m
ij i i ik ik i i txt PT t jT txt λ εε == Ω = ≥ ,    
where j = 1 is transition to employment, j = 2 transition to out-of-the-labour-force, and xi(t) denote the 
vector of covariates of individual i in interval t. In addition to a set of control variables, such as 
individual characteristics, indicators of an individual’s previous labour market history, and the regional 
unemployment rate, xi(t) also includes unemployment benefit variables, as described in the next 
section.  
Following Heckman and Singer (1984), the time–invariant unobserved individual effect, 
m
i ε , is 
assumed to come from an arbitrary discrete probability distribution with a small number of mass points, 
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These mass points and their probabilities, P(εi
m), which can be interpreted as the respective proportion 
of the unemployed in the sample belonging to a particular heterogeneity group, are simultaneously   6
estimated with the parameters of the model. The time-invariant individual effect 
m
i ε  is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the set of explanatory variables in the model,  ( ) i x t . 
Assuming that, conditional on the vector of covariates and the individual effect, εi
m,  the two exit 
states are independent and can thus be modeled as competing risks
2, the overall hazard rate from 
unemployment is the sum of the two state-specific hazard rates: 
(3)  () ()
2
1




txt txt λ ελ ε
=
=∑  
Hence, the conditional probability of remaining unemployed in interval t, given the spell has already 
lasted until t-1 is 
(4)  () ( ) , ( ), 1 ( ),
mk m
ik ik i i i i PT tT txt txt ε λε >≥ = −  
The survivor function is the unconditional probability of still being unemployed after the end of 
interval t. It is the product of the probabilities of remaining unemployed in all previous periods until t: 
(5)  () () () () ( )
1
, ( ), 1 ( ),
t
km m km
ii i ki i i i St x t P T t x t x
τ
εε λ τ τ ε
=
=> = − ∏  
Finally, the unconditional probability that individual i leaves unemployment in interval t into state j can 
be expressed in terms of the hazard rate as: 
(6)  () () () ( )
1
1
( ), ( ), 1 ( ),
t
mk m k m
ik i i j i i i i PT txt txt x
τ
ελ ε λ τ τ ε
−
=
== − ∏  
The specification of the hazard rate is a multinomial logit with the three alternatives unemployment, 
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1   Full-time work, part-time work, temporary work, and vocational training are grouped to the state “employment”, while 
all other states except for unemployment are grouped to “Out-of-the-labour-force”. The latter are for example 
retirement, education or working at home. 
2   Of course, without conditioning on the individual effect transitions into the two states will be correlated.   7
where  αj(t) denotes the baseline hazard which is common to all individuals and depends only on 
elapsed spell duration. In the empirical model we specify the baseline hazard by a set of dummy 
variables, with the first month as the base category. In order to avoid duration categories containing 
only a few exits from unemployment, we aggregate months referring to longer durations. Estimated  
coefficients of these baseline dummies represent the average effect of a single month within a duration 
category. Due to the inclusion of the error component εi
m, the multinomial logit specification does not 
imply the IIA assumption, i.e., the effect of some component in  ( ) i x t  on the relative odds-ratio 
between two alternatives, e.g.. unemployment and employment, does depend on the presence of other 
alternatives, the out-of-the-labour-force state in this case. 
Given the multinomial logit specification, the survivor function is 





























For completed spells the likelihood contribution is given by (6), and by the survivor function in (8) for 
a right-censored spell. Introducing the indicator variable δijk with is 1 if the k-th unemployment spell of 
individual  i ends in state j (0 otherwise), and cik which takes on the value 1 if the k-th spell of 
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where n is the number of individuals in the sample, and Ki the number of spells of individual i. This 
function is maximized with respect to the coefficients on the baseline hazard, αj, the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables, βj, and the mass–points together with the corresponding probabilities,  ( )
m
i P ε , 
taking into account the restrictions on the individual effects given in equation (2) above by standard 
numerical optimization procedures.
3 
                                                 
3   The Stata programme gllamm version 2.3.10 was used for the estimations (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2004).   8
3.2  Data and Variables 
The data base for the empirical analysis is the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), which started in 
1984 in West Germany with 12,245 persons and 5,912 households. Since then, the sample has been 
continuously followed up every year. In June 1990 it was extended to include East Germany with 2,179 
households and 4,453 persons. There were refreshments in 1998 and 2000, resulting in a sample size of 
24,586 adult individuals living in 13,258 households that participated in the SOEP survey in 2000 
(SOEP 2004).  
Constructing Unemployment Spells from Calendar Data in the SOEP 
The SOEP contains retrospective monthly calendar information on the labour force status in the 
previous year (there are 14 different states). Unemployment duration is coded on a monthly basis. We 
restrict the sample to unemployment spells that started between January 1995 and December 2003 
using retrospective information of the waves from 1996 to 2004. Spells that have not been finished in 
December 2003 are treated as right-censored in the empirical analysis. We use information from waves 
1988 to 2004 because an individual’s work history up to seven years prior to the beginning of an 
unemployment spell is needed to compute UB eligibility (see section 2).  
 
Table 2   Construction of unemployment spells 
   Men Women 
   West East West East Total 
Spells  between  1995  and  2003  3,194 2,361 2,510 2,071  10,193 
         
Spells  dropped:       
Left  censored  349 162 242 211 992 
Work  history  information  missing  169 103 135  59 483 
58 years and older  179  130  98  62  469 
Covariates  missing  250 184 244 211 900 
Spells  used  2,247 1,782 1,791 1,528 7,348 
Individuals  1,451 972  1,307 882  4,612 
Person-months    21,349 14,882 17,586 18,445 72,262 
Exit  to       
Employment  1,534 1,302 1,043  982 4,861 
Out-of-the-labour-force  273 206 358 257  1094 
Right-censored  440 274 390 289  1393 
Average duration of spell (months) 9.50  8.35  9.82  12.07  9.83 
Source: SOEP, waves 1995-2003, own calculations.   9
We distinguish between two transitions from unemployment: employment and out-of-the-labour-
force. Spells of unemployed aged 58 years and older are excluded because of special regulations for 
this group (see section 2). Spells are also dropped from the sample if information on one or more 
covariates required for the subsequent analysis is missing, or if there is no full information on the work 
history for at least three years prior to the spell to compute eligibility for unemployment insurance 
benefits. Information on the number of excluded spells and exit states of the spells that enter the 
analysis is given in Table 2. There is a total of 10,193 spells between 1995 and 2003. 
The variables representing the unemployment insurance system are the remaining months of 
entitlement to UB and the income-replacement ratio. Both of them are time-varying covariates, that is, 
they may take on different values for the same spell at different points of time. They are not directly 
available in the SOEP and have to be computed, as described below. 
 
Computation of Remaining Benefit-Entitlement Period 
To identify possible spikes in the hazard around the time of benefit exhaustion, we construct a set of 
dummy variables measuring the remaining months of UB entitlement by deducting the elapsed spell 
duration from an individual’s maximum (potential) entitlement period. There are two possible ways to 
determine an individual’s potential benefit-entitlement period from the information provided in the 
SOEP: First, for persons whose unemployment duration exceeds the period of actual UB receipt it can 
be assumed that their UB entitlement ended during the spell, and the observed period of UB receipt 
equals their potential entitlement period. This reasoning cannot be applied to persons who still received 
UB in the month when their unemployment spell ended. Hence, to make sure that an individual’s UB 
entitlement really expired before unemployment ended, spell duration has to exceed the period of 
benefit receipt by at least one month. To account for the possibility of a waiting period at the beginning 
of the unemployment spell in case the previous job was voluntarily terminated or benefit sanctions for 
other reasons, the duration of unemployment should exceed the period of benefit receipt by at least two 
months.  
Since the unemployment duration exceeds the duration of benefit receipt by two months for only 
about half of all spells in our data, and in order to be able to perform the ex-ante simulations of the 
recent policy reform described below, we compute the potential benefit-entitlement duration using the 
information on the work history seven years prior to the spell and the age of the unemployed according 
to Table 1 in section 2. Thereby, we also take into account the regulatory change in April 1997 
including the transition period. For about 37% of all spells the entitlement durations were computed   10
according to the regulations before the change. Most of these spells began after April 1997 but, due to 
the transition period, were subject to the pre-reform regulations. 
 
Table 3   Information on previous labour market state for the computation of entitlement to UB 
Information on previous labour market state  #  spells  % 
(1) Full Information for seven years prior to the spell begin  3,030  41.24 
(2) Full Information for seven years when using tenure  1,302  17.72 
      Only full information for the last three years:       
(3) Enough information to detect maximum entitlement duration  752  10.23 
(4) Not eligible  516  7.02 
(5) Eligible, assigned to the maximum duration  284  3.86 
(6) Not enough Information but original value observed  288  3.92 
(7) Multiple Spell  307  4.18 
(8) corrected to observed value  459  6.25 
(9) corrected to 0  410  5.58 
Total  7,348  100.00 
Source: SOEP, waves 1995-2003, own calculations. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the information available in the SOEP used to construct the entitlement variable. 
For 483 spells information on labour market status for the last three years previous was insufficient to 
construct the entitlement variable; these spells had therefore to be dropped from the subsequent 
analysis. In order not to lose too many observations, another 284 spells without sufficient information 
but observable duration of UB receipt were assigned to the observed duration. If the duration of UB 
receipt coded in the SOEP exceeded an individual’s computed potential duration, the observed value 
was used. On the other hand, the expected amount of UB entitlement was set to zero if no UB receipt 
for the person was coded in the data and the length of the unemployment spell exceeded two months. 
Possible reasons for this discrepancy are measurement error, suspension of UB up to 3 months because 
of voluntary termination of the previous job or imposition of a sanction because of the rejection of a 
suitable job offer. 
 
Computation of the Income-Replacement Ratio 
The income-replacement ratio (IRR) is defined as the amount of UB received divided by an 
individual’s potential net earnings if she took up a job. This counterfactual is computed in three steps. 
−  First, we estimate for each unemployed expected hourly wages on the pooled sample of the SOEP 
for the years 1995 to 2004 accounting for potential selectivity bias using the two-step Heckman 
(1979) procedure. The wage equations and the selection equations are estimated separately for men   11
and women in East and West Germany; regression results are reported in Table A1 in the appendix. 
Instruments in the participation equation are education, experience, reduction in earning capacity, 
nationality, marital status, children, region, and other household income. As in the wage equations, 
experience is divided into years of full-time and part-time employment for women.  
−  From these selectivity-corrected wage equations we derive expected gross hourly wages, 
conditional of being non-employed. Since the variance of estimated wages is much lower than the 
variance of observed wages we adjust the former by adding a stochastic term to expected wages of 
the unemployed, where this error term is drawn form the residuals obtained from the estimated 
selectivity-corrected wage equation. Potential gross earnings are computed by multiplying the 
estimated conditional gross hourly wage by four times the number of weekly working hours. It is 
assumed that individuals who worked full-time before are willing to work full-time in the new job, 
while individuals who used to work part-time, also want to work part-time in their future job. 
Further assuming that individuals do not change industry, we have calculated the average working 
hours of full-time and part-time employed people in each industry by gender and regions and 
assigned each individual the number of expected working hours to calculate gross earnings per 
calendar year.  
−  Finally, net earnings are computed by applying a simple tax function to gross earnings derived in 
the previous step, where the log of the gross-net earnings differential is regressed on a polynomial 
in the gross wage, some characteristics known to affect the tax rate due to special legislation in the 
tax code, and year dummies (see Table A2 in the Appendix).   
Dividing the amount of UB or UA per month by monthly net earnings yields IRR exceeding one for 
some individuals, which implies that they receive higher benefits than they would be able to earn if 
they took up a job. One reason for this might be that our procedure to compute expected wages does 
still not well predict very high wages. That is, an unemployed who would receive a very high wage if 
he took up a job could be assigned a predicted wage that is only one third of the real potential wage. 
Even if one takes into account the social insurance contribution ceiling that results in benefits lower 
than 60-67% of the former net wage (in case of UB), the replacement rate could be rather high. To 
avoid bias due to measurement errors of the numerator (the benefits), we excluded 187 spells with 
replacement rates of more than 1.5.    
Since the SOEP only contains information on the average amount of UB or UA received during a 
year, we have to allocate this amount to particular months within that year. Following Wolff (2003), we 
assume that if a person received UB for n months, she received it during the first n months of the   12
unemployment spell. If she also received UA in the same year, it is assumed that it is received after UB 
entitlement is exhausted. For people who are not entitled to UB but receive UA we assume that 
entitlement to the latter starts at the beginning of the spell. For a number of people, the length of 
unemployment exceeds the length of UB receipt by one month in a given calendar year – e.g. a person 
is unemployed from June until December in the year 1999, but the duration of benefit receipt in 1999 is 
only six months. In this case it is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether they were not eligible for 
UB anymore in the last month and left unemployment then or if they did not receive benefits in the first 
month due to sanctions or some type of rounding error
4 but were still entitled when they left 
unemployment. This is important because we want to identify the effect the last months of UB 
entitlement has on an individual’s probability to leave unemployment. For people who are still 
unemployed and receive UB in the following year we assumed that they did not receive UB in the first 
month of their spell but in the last month of the last year. If UB is not received in the following year, 
we assume that entitlement ended in the last month. For people who are not unemployed in the 
following year, it is assumed that they did receive UB benefits in the first month of their spell and ran 
out of entitlement in the last month.  
To analyse if there is a different impact of the receipt of UB rather than of UA on the behaviour 
of the unemployed, we use two different replacement rates. The first one, “replacement UB”, takes on 
the value of the replacement rate if the person receives UB, and zero otherwise. The second one, 
”replacement UA” takes on the value of the replacement rate if the individual receives UA, and zero 
otherwise. To account for non-linear effects of the replacement rate on the hazard rate, the squares of 
both interaction terms will also be included in the regression. 
 
Structure of Unemployment Compensation 
Table 4 summarizes relevant information on the variables used to describe the structure of 
unemployment compensation in the subsequent empirical analysis. In the observation period, men in 
East Germany have been more likely to be eligible for both UB and UA, and they have longer 
maximum entitlement durations. Roughly 30% of all unemployed are not eligible for UB, whereas 
about 43% have a maximum entitlement duration of 7-12 months. The latter results from the majority 
of unemployed being entitled to UB for a maximum of 12 months. As could be expected, men in West 
Germany have the highest potential net income and amount of both UB and UA. While their amount of 
                                                 
4   Because the data are grouped to monthly observations, while entitlement periods are calculated on a daily basis in 
reality.   13
UB exceeds that of men in East Germany by about 15%, the potential net income is even 22% higher. 
This leads to a lower income replacement rate for men in the West compared to those in East Germany. 
Women have much lower amounts of UB and UA due to lower average hourly wages and the 
prevalence of part-time work. The higher amount of UB for East-German women compared to those in 
West Germany is related to higher average hours in the former job (37.9 hours compared to 34.5). 
Nevertheless, women in West Germany have higher potential net wages, again resulting in lower 
replacement rates.  
 
Table 4   Descriptive statistics on variables concerning unemployment and the UI system 
   Men Women 
   West East West East Total 
Average entitlement to UB (months)  9.20  10.53  8.68  9.02  9.36 
Maximum UB entitlement period            
0  months  31.73% 24.19% 36.01% 31.41% 30.88% 
1-6  months  7.12% 9.88% 4.91%  11.39% 8.14% 
7-12  months  45.62% 43.88% 45.00% 39.33% 43.74% 
13-18  months  3.56% 5.39% 4.08% 5.10% 4.45% 
>  18  months  11.97% 16.67%  9.99% 12.76% 12.79% 
(1) UB received  64.89%  74.41% 58.12% 67.28% 66.05% 
(2) UB exhausted (of 1)  29.90%  22.78%  35.16%  36.38%  30.46% 
(3) UA  after exhaustion of UB (of 2)  46.79%  59.27%  36.61%  66.31%  51.76% 
(4) Neither UB nor ALH  27.33%  15.77%  33.61%  20.16%  24.56% 
Mean amount of UB ( > 0)  831.61  721.43  544.21  595.67  684.25 
Mean amount of UA ( > 0)  608.04  557.23  444.67  430.31  509.34 
Mean Potential Net Income   1313.27  1075.38  881.52  877.67  1048.07 
Mean Potential Net Income (at begin)  1340.94  1103.26  908.05  886.76  1083.46 
Income Replacement Ratio, IRR  0.40  0.54  0.38  0.48  0.44 
IRR  (> 0)   0.57  0.64  0.59  0.62  0.60 
IRR if received UB  0.62 0.67 0.64 0.69 0.65 
IRR if received UA  0.50 0.57 0.52 0.53 0.53 
Source: SOEP, waves 1995-2003, own calculations. 
 
Control variables 
In addition to unemployment variables, we include a number of variables that control for differences in 
individual characteristics and other observed factors affecting individual unemployment behavior 
through their effects on reservation wages, job offer arrival rates and wage offer distributions. These 
include personal characteristics, indicators of household composition, human capital variables and   14
indicators for the state of the aggregate labor market. Human capital variables include education and 
position in the last job, and previous unemployment experience. Some of these variables, e.g. the 
regional unemployment rate, depend on both process and calendar time. We also include a “December 
dummy” to account for "heaping effects", i.e. the disproportionate number of spells ending in 
December due to rounding errors of interviewees' responses in the calendar data (see Hunt 1995, Kraus 
and Steiner 1997). Means of control variables are contained in Table A1 in the appendix.  
 
4 Estimation  Results 
The estimations are carried out separately for men and women in East and West Germany because 
there are still marked differences by gender and the structure of labour markets between the two 
regions. Detailed estimation results are reported in Table A4 for men and Table A5 for women in the 
Appendix. Since the focus of the analysis is on the effects of the unemployment compensation system 
on these hazard rates, we will not discuss estimation results for the control variables here. Although we 
include a fairly large number of control variables in the hazard rate models, unobserved heterogeneity 
remains quantitatively important. Statistical tests based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
5 
indicate that two heterogeneity groups, i.e. mass points, are sufficient to account for remaining 
unobserved heterogeneity for men and women in West Germany, whereas three mass points are 
required for both men and women in East Germany. These mass points and their probabilities are 
reported at the bottom of Tables A4 and A5, respectively. Except for the coefficients of the baseline 
dummies, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity had very little effect on the parameter estimates, 
however.  
Estimation results for the unemployment compensation variables defined in the previous section 
are summarised in Table 5. Estimated coefficients on the remaining benefit-entitlement dummies are to 
be interpreted relative to the base category, which is remaining entitlement of more than 19 months. 
Differences in the coefficients of two remaining entitlement categories show the effect of the transition 
from one category to the other one on the hazard rate to the respective exit state. As described in 
section 3, entitlement durations do not only differ by age and previous labour market experience, but 
also by entry cohort due to the regulatory changes of April 1997 and the special regulations for 
multiple UB receipt within the base periods.  
                                                 
5   Defined as AIC = lnlik – k, where k  is the number of parameters and lnlik is the log likelihood of the model at its 
maximum. The decision rule is to take the model with the highest AIC.   15
A “real” entitlement effect would imply that coefficients on the entitlement dummies are 
monotonically increasing as remaining entitlement duration decreases. As shown in Table 5, there 
seems to be no strictly monotonic relation between the hazard rate from unemployment neither to 
employment nor out-of-the-labour force. For example, the coefficient of the 3-4 months remaining 
entitlement dummy is higher than the one indicating a remaining period of two months in some  cases. 
However, the hazard rate from unemployment to employment increases significantly for most groups 
close to the month of benefit-exhaustion. For example, for men in West Germany the coefficient on the 
remaining entitlement dummy increases from about 0.19 to 0.47 when the unemployed moves form one 
remaining month of UB entitlement to the month when UB is exhausted (0 months). Similar effects of 
benefit exhaustion on the hazard rate to employment are also obtained for East-German men and for 
women in both regions. There is also a strong effect of UB exhaustion on the hazard rate to out-of-the-
labour force for women, especially in East Germany. This indicates that some of the unemployed wait 
until exhaustion of UB eligibility before they take up a new job or drop out of the labour force.  
After benefit exhaustion (remaining entitlement < 0 months), the hazard rate from unemployment 
to employment, and to a lesser degree also to out-of-the-labour-force, seems to increase further. 
However, to compare these two months one also has to consider the effects induced by changes in the 
income replacement ratio (IRR) as well. Since the unemployed could be entitled to Unemployment 
Assistance after exhaustion of the UB, the IRR need not drop to zero but could take on a positive – if 
lower – value. It is therefore important also to account for this effect when simulating the total effect of 
changes in unemployment compensation on the hazard rate from unemployment.  
Estimated coefficients of the IRR interaction variables described in the previous section are 
summarised in the lower part of Table 5. The interaction terms between the IRR and the dummy 
variables for, respectively, entitlement to UB and UA on the hazard rate to both employment and out-
of-the-labour-force are negative for all groups, as expected, and statistically significant in most cases. 
The positive sign of the coefficients on the squared interaction terms may seem unexpected at first 
sight, because it indicates that the negative effect of the amount of UB received on the hazard rate from 
unemployment is diminishing in its level. However, the relative size of estimated coefficients on the 
respective interaction term and its square implies that the overall effect remains negative as long as the 
IRR is smaller than about 0.75, which is the case for almost 90% of all observations. The estimates 
have the plausible implication that an increase in UB at low levels of the IRR has a stronger negative 
effect on the hazard rate than at high levels, at least up to an IRR of about 75%. For UA estimated 
coefficients imply marginal effects that are much higher (in absolute values) and decrease faster than 
for UB receipt, with the sign of the total effect turning positive for only about 5% of all observations.Table 5   Estimated effects of unemployment compensation on hazard rates to employment and out-of-the-labour force by gender and region 
  Men - West  Men - East  Women  - West  Women - East 
  
Employment  Out-of-the-  
labour-force 
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
0.129  0.534  0.115  1.863  0.367  -0.035  0.233  0.648 
Not entitled to UB 
(0.75)  (1.97)*  (0.55)  (3.89)***  (1.87)  (-0.10)  (0.94)  (1.42) 
Remaining Entitlement:              
0.985  1.364  0.847  2.244  1.150  1.102  1.101  1.304 
< 0 Months 
(5.81)***  (4.49)***  (4.01)***  (4.70)***  (5.60)***  (3.03)**  (4.54)***  (2.91)** 
0.47  0.885  0.699  1.821  0.928  0.912  0.732  1.322 
0 Months 
(1.92)  (1.69)  (2.78)**  (2.78)**  (3.23)**  (2.25)*  (2.59)**  (2.64)** 
0.189  0.692  0.561  2.071  0.538  0.322  0.375  -0.019 
1 Month 
(0.74)  (1.23)  (2.25)*  (3.56)***  (1.88)  (0.71)  (1.30)  (-0.03) 
0.005  0.836  0.169  2.261  0.317  0.127  0.488  1.031 
2 Months 
(0.02)  (1.58)  (0.65)  (4.22)***  (1.07)  (0.28)  (1.74)  (2.11)* 
0.462  0.666  0.157  1.952  0.626  0.832  0.446  -0.264 
3-4 Months 
(2.42)*  (1.49)  (0.78)  (4.59)***  (2.93)**  (2.21)*  (1.88)  (-0.53) 
0.603  0.419  0.300  0.666  0.495  0.523  0.163  0.148 
5-6 Months 
(3.5)***  (1.04)  (1.57)  (1.21)  (2.41)*  (1.39)  (0.69)  (0.34) 
0.398  0.642  0.147  1.761  0.674  0.283  0.006  -0.004 
7-8 Months 
(2.31)*  (1.73)  (0.78)  (3.77)***  (3.26)**  (0.72)  (0.02)  (-0.01) 
0.579  1.546  0.298  1.615  0.744  0.138  0.185  0.12 
9-12 Months 
(3.84)***  (6.26)***  (1.81)  (4.05)***  (4.40)***  (0.40)  (0.84)  (0.29) 
0.097  0.632  0.053  0.480  0.490  -0.158  0.470  0.121 
13-18 Months 
(0.45)  (1.74)  (0.33)  (0.78)  (2.06)*  (-0.36)  (2.01)*  (0.26) 
Income Replacement 
Rate (IRR)                         
-2.131  -2.457  -1.467  -1.416  -2.078  -2.283  -1.166  -1.365 
IRR × received UB  (-6.27)***  (-3.17)**  (-3.75)***  (-1.42)  (-5.11)***  (-3.74)***  (-2.69)**  (-1.51) 
1.476  1.302  0.758  0.198  1.379  0.951  0.726  0.715  (IRR × received UB) 
squared  (4.88)***  (1.52)  (2.45)*  (0.21)  (4.26)***  (1.69)  (2.24)*  (1.05) 
-5.114  -5.182  -3.453  -5.86  -4.315  -8.298  -3.669  -2.975 
IRR × received UA  (-9.87)***  (-5.41)***  (-5.99)***  (-5.36)***  (-7.6)***  (-6.66)***  (-6.90)***  (-3.03)** 
3.89  3.245  2.194  4.375  2.686  5.099  2.587  0.642  (IRR. × received UA) 
squared   (6.6)***  (3.36)***  (3.51)***  (3.99)***  (4.76)***  (4.24)***  (4.77)***  (0.53) 
Notes:  For full estimation results see Tables A4and A5 in the Appendix. t-values are given in parantheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   17
Figure 1   Benefit-entitlement effects on hazard rates to  … - men 
Employment 
























































































































































































































































Notes:   Explanatory variables are evaluated at base categories for dummy variables and at sample means for metric 
variables; hazard rates are ‘averaged’ across heterogeneity groups, see text. 
Source: Estimation results as reported in Table A4 in the Appendix.   18
Figure 2   Benefit-entitlement effects on hazard rates to  … - women 
Employment 























































































































































































































































Notes:    Explanatory variables are evaluated at base categories for dummy variables and at sample means for metric 
variables; hazard rates are ‘averaged’ across heterogeneity groups, see text.  
Source: Estimation results as reported in Table A5 in the Appendix. 
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To compute the effects of unemployment compensation on hazard rates in a given month of the 
unemployment spell, the effect of the remaining UB-entitlement period in the respective month as well 
as the impact of changes in the IRR on the hazard rate have to be considered. Furthermore, because of 
the non-linearity of the hazard rate, the impact of the benefit-entitlement variables and the IRR will 
also depend on its level, changes in the baseline hazard rate also have to be considered. To account for 
all these effects, we simulate the evolution of the hazard rates from unemployment for different groups, 
and conditional on alternative assumptions concerning UB entitlement at the beginning of an 
individual’s unemployment spell. The control variables are assumed constant and take on the following 
values: Variables with metric measurement (except for the IRR) are set to the respective sample means; 
dummy variables are set to represent a person who is between 44 and 52 years, married, without 
children, German, not disabled, with vocational training and A-levels, who lives in North-Rhine 
Westphalia (Saxony for East Germans) and was not unemployed before. The other dummy variables 
also take on mean values, except for the baseline hazard and the remaining entitlement variables. The 
baseline dummies and the remaining entitlement duration change with elapsed spell duration. The 
replacement rates are set to the respective means for each group - as reported in Table 4 - in case of 
eligibility, and zero otherwise. The hazard rates are the expected values for unemployed people of the 
reference group, i.e. we take the expectation over the estimated heterogeneity groups. Empirically, this 
expectation is calculated as the weighted sum of the hazard rates over the two (three) mass points 
(heterogeneity groups), with their estimated probabilities as weights. 
As Figures 1 and 2 show, simulated hazard rates to employment are fairly constant or slightly 
decreasing until UB entitlement is exhausted, and increase immediately before that month. To this 
point, the pattern of hazard rates more or less corresponds to the estimated entitlement coefficients 
summarised in Table 5 above. After UB-entitlement exhaustion, simulated hazard rates depend very 
much on whether or not the unemployed are entitled to UA. In case they do, the hazard rate stays more 
or less constant or slightly declines with increasing unemployment duration; if they are not entitled to 
draw UA, the hazard rate jumps to a much higher level in the month following and subsequently stays 
there or declines only slightly. For example, the average hazard rate from unemployment to 
employment in the group of West German men with an assumed initial UB-entitlement period of 12 
months has reached about 8 percent after 12 month, virtually the same level as at the beginning of the 
spell. If UA is not available for a typical person in this group, his hazard rate more than doubles in the 
month following the exhaustion of UB-entitlement to almost 18%, and subsequently remains at this 
high level. In contrast, in case UA is not available to this person there is no upward-jump in the hazard 
rate in the month following UB-entitlement exhaustion, and the hazard rate declines slightly in the   20
subsequent months (Figure 1a). A similar pattern can also be observed for East-German men (Figure 
1b) as well as women in both regions (Figures 2a and 2b), although the hazard rates differ somewhat in 
levels between these groups. Furthermore, a similar pattern regarding the spike in the hazard rate in the 
month following UB-benefit exhaustion also obtains in case the initial UB-entitlement period is set to, 
e.g., 18 months, as illustrated in Figures 1c and 1d for men and Figures 2c and 2d for women, or for 
other assumed maximum initial benefit-entitlement periods defined in section 2 as well.  
Simulated hazard rates to out-of-the-labour-force, too, exhibit an upward-jump in the month 
following UB-entitlement exhaustion in case there is no subsequent eligibility to UA (see lower part of 
Figures 1 and 2). Again, this effect can be observed for the various initial UB-entitlement periods 
defined above, and for all groups considered here. Since the male out-of-the-labour-force hazard rate is 
rather low, for men this effect is of limited quantitative importance. Especially for women in West 
Germany, however, this effect is rather large and suggests that only after UB-entitlement has been 
exhausted is unemployment terminated by way of labour force withdrawal. This effect is much less 
pronounced for women in East Germany, which is compatible with the higher labour force 
participation rate of East German women compared to the West. 
 
5 Policy  Simulations 
On the basis of the estimation results described in the previous section, we now simulate the effects of 
the two main regulatory changes considered in section 2, i.e. the reduction of the potential entitlement 
period to UB (including tightened eligibility criteria) which came into effect in February 2006, and the 
replacement of UA by UB II enacted in January 2005. The calculation of the potential entitlement 
periods after the reforms assumes that the changes have already been fully phased in, i.e. the existing 
transition periods are not modelled. That is, the analysis examines the long-term effects of the reform.  
In Table 6, we compare the distribution of UB-entitlement periods in the sample before and after 
the reforms. There is no change for about 80% of all unemployed people in the West and for 70% in 
the East. Those affected are especially older unemployed men with relatively long previous insured 
employment histories whose maximum entitlement duration is cut. Whereas between 14% 
(women/West) and 22% (men/East) of all unemployed were entitled to at least 13 months of UB before 
2006, this share now ranges between 2,4% and about 4%. Although this change is mainly related to the 
marked reduction of maximum UB-entitlement periods for the older unemployed, part of the younger 
unemployed are also affected. Roughly 5% of all unemployed people who would have been eligible for 
UB before the reform are not entitled anymore under the new regulations.    21
Since UB II is means tested and depends on household income rather than previous individual net 
income, the effects of the reform differ for claimants in the same age group, with the same work 
history. As described in section 2, until 2005 a household with an unemployed receiving UA or UB 
could also receive “Supplementary Social Assistance” if total net household income was below the 
household’s social minimum. For example, a single unemployed person with previous gross income of 
1,500 € would, after exhaustion of UB and if eligible, have been entitled to UA in the amount of 552 €. 
Since this amount was below the Social Assistance of 664 €, the person could obtain Supplementary 
Social Assistance of 112 €. After the reform, UB II including allowances for housing and heating for a 
single person amounts, on average, to about 670 €. Thus, the reform has changed very little in this case. 
However, if the person had previously earned 3,000 € per month, say, UA would have been about 900 
€ before the reform, and he would have lost about 230 € due to the reform. Larger households that were 
already eligible to Supplementary Social Assistance before the reform, were hardly affected by the 
introduction of UB II if they still passed the slightly tighter means-test after the reform.
6 
 
Table 6   Distribution of benefit-entitlement durations before and after the reforms in the sample  
  Men Women 
  West East West East 
  before    after  before  after before after before after 
UB-entitlement ( s h a r e s   i n   % )              
0  months  31.7 36.5 24.2 29.3 36.0 39.7 31.4 35.8 
1-12  months  52.7 60.2 53.8 66.5 49.9 57.9 50.7 61.1 
13-18  months  3.6 3.4 5.4 4.1 4.1 2.4 5.1 3.1 
>  19  months  12.0 0.0  16.7 0.0  10.0 0.0  12.8 0.0 
Average entitlement duration  (months)  9.2 6.9  10.5 7.4 8.7 6.8 9.0 6.5 
UA-entitlement (shares in %)         
No  change  78.0 70.2 80.3 72.6 
Reduced  entitlement  22.0 29.8 19.7 27.4 
Entitlement completely lost  5.0  5.7  4.4  5.3 
Source:  SOEP, waves 1995-2003, own calculations.  
 
To account for the substantial heterogeneity across households in terms of benefit-entitlement and, at 
the same time, keep the empirical analysis comprehensible, in the following we distinguish between 
type of household (single, no children; couples with and without children), four age groups (40, 45, 52, 
and 57 years) and three income groups (low, average and high income). For simplicity, we use the 
                                                 
6   Since the SOEP does not provide sufficient information on the assets of a households, we have to assume that all 
unemployed who were eligible for UA  before also pass the means-test for UB II.    22
average IRR for to calculate the amount of UB for all income groups. The simulated replacement rates 
for UA and UB II are then computed assuming the same potential net income as before but with the 
adjusted amount of benefits. For example, a single unemployed person with gross income of 3,000 € in 
his previous job receives UB in the amount of 1,024.50 €. The assumed income-replacement ratio of 
0.62 for West German men yields potential net income of 1024.5 € / 0.62 = 1652.4 €. The amount of 
UA of 905 € yields a replacement rate of 905 €/1652.42 € = 0.548, whereas the UB II amount of 666 € 
results in a replacement rate of 0.403.  
Simulated survival rates before and after the reforms for the various household and income types 
are reported in Table A6 for men and in Table A7 for women in the Appendix. The simulations are 
based on estimation results for the hazard rate models summarized in Tables A4 and A5 and assume 
that the reform does not affect employment behaviour of potential claimants prior to the unemployment 
spell. Furthermore, we have to assume that job offer arrival rates and offered wages are not affected by 
the reform. The dynamic effects of the reform are assessed by comparing survival rates after 6, 12, 18, 
and 24 months of the unemployment spell before and after the reforms for some reference groups. 
These survival rates are calculated using equation (8) in section 3.1 and estimated coefficients from our 
preferred specifications of the hazard rate model. The survival rate after 6 months, for example, can be 
interpreted as the share of individuals who became unemployed in a given month and are still 
unemployed six months later. Except for age, benefit entitlement and household structure, the 
definition of the reference groups is the same as the one used in Figures 1 and 2.  
As shown in Tables A6 and A7, there is substantial heterogeneity in simulated responses to the 
reform across the various groups. Block A of each table shows changes in survival rates for three age 
groups of unemployed people living in couple households with no children and an average level of 
gross earnings in the previous job. These age groups are differently affected by the reduction of the 
maximum UB-entitlement period after the reform, but are not affected by the reform of UA because 
they are not eligible to means-tested benefits under either regulation. This also means that a reduction 
in UB-entitlement effectively reduces household income.  
For most of the groups shown in the tables, simulated survival rates decline substantially after the 
reform. For example, the 12-months’ survival rate of West German unemployed men aged 52 declines 
by 12 percentage points, from 54% to 42%. For this group, the 18-months’ survival rate declines from 
37% to 14%, and the survival after 24 months is just 5% after the reform, compared to almost 30% 
before it. For East German men and women in both regions of the same age group, simulated reduction 
in survival rates due to the reform would also be substantial, although somewhat smaller in absolute 
magnitude. Smaller reductions in survival rate are also to be expected for the older (57 years) and   23
especially the younger (45 years) age groups for men and women in both regions, as shown in Tables 
A6 and A7. 
Block B of Tables A6 and A7 shows changes in survival rates for a single unemployed person 
with alternative levels of previous gross earnings (low/high) by age group. In addition to the three age 
groups considered above, unemployed singles aged 40 years for whom there was no change in the UB-
entitlement period are included in the comparison. For this latter group with low earnings in the 
previous job the reform did not affect net household incomes because the amount of UB II almost 
equals the former UA, as described above. Thus, the reform has no effect on survival rates for this 
group. Unemployed people of this age but with high previous earnings get less UB II after the reform, 
but this only becomes effective after exhaustion of regular UB after 12 months. This has very little 
effect on survival rates after 12 months. For the older age groups, for whom the maximum UB-
entitlement period is cut depending on age, reductions of survival rates induced by the reform are 
somewhat larger but still rather modest. The largest effect occurs for East German men in the oldest 
age group, for whom the cut of the maximum UB-entitlement period from 32 to 18 months induces, 
irrespective of the level of previous earnings, a fall in this group’s 18-months survival rate by 18 
percentage points, from 56% to 37%. A similar pattern can also be observed for unemployed people 
living in couple households with a child, as shown in (block C). Still, these effects are limited relative 
to the impact the eligibility to UB II subsequent to the exhaustion of UB has on the survival rate in 
unemployment (see Figures 1 and 2).  
 
Table 7   Simulated effects of reform on survival rates in and the median duration of unemployment  
    Before reform    After reform 
    Survival rates (in %)  Median    Survival rates (in %)  Median 
    6  12  18  24  (months)    6  12  18  24  (months) 
men/West  54  42  38  35  8.0     53  39  34  31  7.0 
men/East  47  29  22  17  6.8     45  25  18  12  5.0 
women/West  63  46  37  32  10.5     62  42  30  25  9.0 
Whole 
Sample 
women/East  64  46  37  33  10.0     63  41  31  25  9.0 
                                      
men/West  74  61  55  49  23.0     68  53  46  40  14.0 
men/East  59  39  31  24  8.0     54  31  24  18  7.0 
women/West  80  63  52  45  20.0     75  57  42  34  14.0 
45 years   
and older 
women/East  73  55  46  42  15.0     72  51  40  34  12.5 
Notes:  Simulations based on estimation results in Tables A4 and A5 and assumptions about benefit entitlement, see text. 
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Table 7 summarises simulation results more comprehensively in terms of average survival rates 
and median unemployment durations before and after the reform for those unemployed actually 
affected by the reform as derived from the information in the data and summarised in Table 6. The 
upper part of the table reports results for the whole sample, the lower part for unemployed people older 
than 45 years.  
Whereas the reform seems to have only minor effects on survival rates in unemployment, and 
also on its median duration, in the whole sample, the impact on the unemployed older than 45 years is 
substantial. For example, for West-German men older than 45 years the survival rate after 18 (24) 
months would fall from 55% to 46% (49% to 40%), and the median completed duration of 
unemployment form about 23 to 14 months. The share of long-term unemployed people (> 24 months) 
among East German men in this age group would fall from 24% to 18%, and the median duration of 
unemployment from 8 to 7 months. The reform also has a relatively strong impact on older West 
German women, for whom the simulated median unemployment duration falls from 20 to 14 months, 
whereas for East German women of the same age this reduction amounts to less than 3 months.  
Thus, the relatively small effects of the reform on long-term unemployment we obtain for the 
whole sample are almost completely driven by the impact the reform has on older unemployed men and 
women in West Germany, whereas the relatively small overall impact on the East-German unemployed 
is more evenly distributed across all age groups. The stronger impact the reform seems to have on 
younger people in East Germany can be explained by the fact that the share of unemployed people 
living in the East whose amount of UA was cut partly or completely is markedly higher than in the 
West, as shown in Table 6 
 
6  Summary and Conclusion 
Our empirical analysis of the impact of the German unemployment compensation system and its recent 
reform on the duration of unemployment has yielded a number of noteworthy results. First, eligibility 
to unemployment benefit reduces both the transition rate to employment and, especially for women, to 
the out-of-the-labour-force state. Second, benefit-entitlement effects on hazard rates are not 
monotonically increasing as time to exhaustion of UB gets shorter but rather concentrated around the 
month of benefit-exhaustion. These effects differ significantly between the unemployed who are not 
entitled to means-tested Unemployment Assistance subsequent to the exhaustion of UB-entitlement and 
those who are not. For the former group, there is a huge spike in the hazard rate to both employment 
and to the out-of-the-labour-force state in the month following benefit-exhaustion, with both hazard   25
rates thereafter remaining at much higher levels. In contrast, for the latter group the hazard rates more 
or less remain at the previous level or decline slightly after benefit exhaustion. These patterns indicate 
that eligible unemployed wait until benefit-exhaustion before they take up a new job or drop out of the 
labour force. Third, the marginal effects of the amount of both UB and UA are negative and highly 
non-linear but of modest size. These results are qualitatively similar for men and women in East and 
West Germany, although the magnitude of estimated effects differs between groups. 
Our ex-ante evaluation of the recent reform of the unemployment compensation, which reduced 
maximum UB-entitlement periods, especially for the older unemployed, and introduced Unemployment 
Benefit II as a substitute for the previously existing Unemployment Assistance, has shown that the 
reform has only small effects on the duration of unemployment for the population as a whole. 
However, our simulation results also indicate that the share of the long-term unemployed among older 
people is substantially reduced, as is the median unemployment duration for this age group. These 
effects are stronger in West Germany than in the East where the relatively small overall impact on the 
East-German unemployed is more evenly distributed across all age groups. In West Germany, the 
reduction in long-term unemployment of older men and women is mainly induced by the shortened 
UB-entitlement periods, whereas the introduction of UB II seems to have relatively little impact. 
However, we might underestimate this latter effect because the available data do not allow us to model 
the somewhat stricter means test applied to UB II.  
Overall, our simulation results indicate that the recent labour market reform which aroused much 
heated debates and even some political unrest, especially regarding the repeal of UA and the 
introduction of UB II, is unlikely to have a major impact on the average duration of unemployment in 
the population as a whole. However, it will significantly reduce the level of long-term unemployment 
among older workers, and in particular of those aged above 55 years who effectively used the 
previously existing UB-entitlement periods of up to 32 months as a way to early retirement. The 
reduction of long UB-entitlement periods for older people should also reduce incentives to become 
unemployed in the first place, thereby also contributing to a lower level of unemployment among older 
workers. This latter effect which was not analysed in the current paper remains an important topic for 
future research. 
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Table A1   Selectivity-corrected wage regressions– dependent variable: ln(gross hourly wage) 
   Men  Women 
   West  East  West  East 
   coefficent  t-value  coefficent  t-value  coefficent  t-value  coefficent  t-value 
Years of education  0.059  49.95  0.040  20.46  0.062  39.42  0.029  13.95 
Experience  0.019  12.97  0.015  10.56             
Experience squared/100  -0.037  -10.65  -0.033  -9.2             
Full-time              0.011  5.74  0.014  9.33 
Full-time squared/100              -0.023  -3.82  -0.037  -8.87 
Part-time              0.001  0.07  -0.004  -2.49 
Part-time squared/100              -0.001  -0.09  0.01  1.1 
Tenure  0.009  5.05  0.003  2.44  0.01  4.14  0.018  12.31 
Tenure squared/100  -0.016  -2.8  0.001  0.04  -0.015  -1.93  -0.025  -6.03 
Human capital depreciation  -0.051  -6.5  -0.131  -17.04  -0.025  -4.3  -0.058  -9.81 
Years of education x German  0.006  6.05        0.002  1.84       
Experience x German  0.001  -0.28                   
Experience sq./100 x German  -0.002  -0.59                   
Full-time x German              0.005  2.32       
Full-time sq./100 x German              -0.017  -2.72       
Part-time x German              0.002  0.83       
Part-time sq /100 x German              -0.017  -1.31       
Tenure x German  -0.001  -0.72        0.004  1.78       
Tenure sq. /100 x German  0.013  2.17        -0.002  -0.22       
Human cap. depreciation x 
German  -0.071  -7.86        0.003  0.51       
Region:                         
Schl.-Holstein. Hamburg  0.017  1.27        0.034  2.28       
Lower Saxony. Bremen  -0.004  -0.31        -0.015  -1.14       
North Rhine-Westphalia  0.029  2.42        0.005  0.37       
Hesse  0.049  3.86        0.049  3.62       
Rhineland-Palat.. Saarland  -0.006  -0.49        -0.017  -1.23       
Baden-Wuerttemberg  0.073  6.02        0.037  2.87       
Bavaria  0.02  1.69        0.012  0.93       
Mecklenburg-Western Pom.        -0.086  -5.18        -0.130  -7.71 
Brandenburg        -0.092  -6.1        -0.139  -8.96 
Saxony-Anhalt        -0.122  -8.12        -0.16  -10.51 
Thuringia        -0.157  -10.6        -0.156  -9.98 
Saxony        -0.148  -10.5        -0.176  -12.27 
Year:                         
1995  -0.197  -27.67  -0.246  -18.74  -0.147  -17.16  -0.199  -14.06 
1996  -0.163  -22.5  -0.196  -14.53  -0.132  -15.2  -0.172  -11.95 
1997  -0.152  -21.08  -0.162  -12.04  -0.116  -13.43  -0.133  -9.37 
1998  -0.134  -18.67  -0.149  -11.17  -0.092  -10.85  -0.111  -7.8 
1999  -0.129  -17.86  -0.144  -10.71  -0.09  -10.53  -0.099  -7.03 
2000  -0.109  -18.22  -0.135  -11.42  -0.091  -13.13  -0.105  -8.42 
2001  -0.11  -17.62  -0.115  -9.53  -0.078  -10.9  -0.084  -6.61 
2002  -0.031  -5  -0.041  -3.39  -0.022  -3.22  -0.039  -3.09 
Industrial Sector:                         
Agriculture. Forestry  0.058  15.08  0.008  0.8  0.009  1.22  -0.091  -5.27 
Mining. Energy  0.031  2.63  0.095  5.38  0.172  5.88  0.11  3.54 
Chemical Ind.. Synthetics  0.051  8.73  0.041  2.81  0.03  3.7  -0.063  -2.85 
Construction Industry  -0.01  -1.87  -0.005  -0.71  -0.018  -1.25  0.026  1.45 
Heavy Industry  0.016  2.9  -0.027  -2.47  0.021  1.76  -0.048  -1.82 
Textile Industry  -0.132  -7.24  -0.166  -3.43  -0.142  -8.19  -0.298  -10.23 
Retail  -0.071  -12.42  -0.105  -9.78  -0.098  -21.05  -0.152  -16.67 
Railway. Post. Transport  -0.116  -17.92  -0.07  -5.85  -0.01  -0.97  -0.097  -5.57 
Public Services  -0.023  -5.91  0.06  8.67  0.033  12.78  0.084  23.03 
Private Services  0.107  17.36  0.093  7.2  0.042  7.61  0.003  0.28 
Others and Missing  -0.016  -2.24  0.003  0.27  -0.034  -4.55  -0.082  -6.49 
Firm Size:                         
Small  -0.188  -20.88  -0.193  -14.41  -0.188  -27.17  -0.237  -20.25 
Middle  -0.104  -21.59  -0.115  -16.89  -0.063  -13.84  -0.079  -10.46 
Middle-Big  -0.027  -8.88  -0.008  -1.87  -0.014  -3.9  -0.01  -1.78 
Big  0.022  7.2  0.102  14.11  0.048  12.9  0.048  7.56 
Public  -0.016  -6.92  0.023  3.97  0.027  9.13  0.015  2.05 
Constant  1.734  94.83  1.985  57.1  1.516  59.99  2.017  51.96 
mills                         
lambda  0.0002  -0.07  -0.014  -1.34  0.045  6.25  -0.007  -0.6 
Number of observations  51329  17534  57731  19896 
Adjusted R²         
  
Table A2   Tax function regressions – dependent variable: ln[(gross wage - net wage)/(gross wage)]  
   Men  Women 
   West  East  West  East 
   Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
year_1996  0.0002  0.01  0.0249  1.50  0.0211  1.45  0.0014  0.08 
year_1997  0.0108  1.02  0.0351  2.12  0.0440  3.01  0.0203  1.13 
year_1998  0.0154  1.50  0.0555  3.39  0.0338  2.38  0.0382  2.14 
year_1999  0.0010  0.10  0.0464  2.79  0.0344  2.37  0.0368  2.03 
year_2000  -0.0143  -1.55  0.0149  0.98  -0.0054  -0.43  0.0006  0.03 
year_2001  -0.0361  -3.80  -0.0264  -1.69  -0.0252  -1.94  -0.0483  -2.87 
year_2002  -0.0593  -6.36  -0.0452  -2.92  -0.0459  -3.65  -0.0658  -3.93 
year_2003  -0.0319  -3.32  -0.0252  -1.57  -0.0397  -3.08  -0.0076  -0.44 
year_2004  -0.0582  -6.05  -0.0458  -2.88  -0.0564  -4.39  -0.0292  -1.71 
gross wage  -3.4e-05  -13.67  -3.6e-05  -6.31  -1.1e-04  -21.07  3.2e-05  1.74 
(gross 
wage)sq./10000  2.8e-06  6.77  3.0e-06  4.38  9.7e-06  13.20  -6.4e-05  -4.35 
ln(gross wage)  0.3797  53.76  0.3866  33.54  0.4613  55.35  0.3052  15.35 
married  -0.1901  -37.89  -0.0578  -7.27  0.1234  21.31  0.0949  11.62 
children  -0.0452  -21.54  -0.0481  -11.71  0.0104  3.17  0.0009  0.20 
public sector  -0.2436  -46.93  -0.1227  -14.24  -0.0891  -14.95  -0.0682  -8.54 
constant  -3.815  -77.80  -3.9282  -51.51  -4.3055  -79.03  -3.4469  -28.59 
Observations  43161  12823  30629  11143 
Adjusted R²  0.182  0.186  0.170  0.190 Table A3   Means of variables in the hazard rate models    
Variable    Men  Women 
     West  East  West  East 
Personal characteristics         
25 <= Age < 35  25.7  19.6  27.2  20.8 
35 <= Age < 44  19.7  21.9  21.1  26.0 
44 <= Age < 52  15.0  21.8  18.0  19.8 
52 <= Age < 56  8.4  8.9  8.5  9.4 
Age >= 56     14.2  13.7  9.0  13,5 
Foreigner     33.2  -  24.0  - 
Disabled     13.0  5.9  7.7  3,3 
Education and Vocational Qualification         
General elementary   25.2  10.0  26.9  12.5 
Middle vocational  46.8  68.3  43.1  68.1 
Vocational plus college  3.8  1.7  5.9  2.2 
Higher vocational  3.0  5.3  5.2  3.1 
Higher education  10.5  11.5  9.6  11.8 
Trained worker  15.7 29.8  2.5 10.0 
Foreman  8.8  13.3 3.8 2.9 
Self-employed  2.1 2.8 2.7 2.4 
Household variables         
Spouse employed  28.8  32.9  43.1  48.6 
Earnings of spouse/1000  0.25  0.37  0.77  0.63 
Other household income /1000  1.01  0.70  0.84  0.60 
Married     56.0  52.4  55.5  65,1 
Children <= 6 years  30.4  15.9  27.7  20.3 
Children <= 6 years × single  1.5  0.8  6.4  3.8 
Regional dummies         
Northern States  18.6  -  19.4  - 
Hesse  8.3  -  7.6  - 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland  8.2  -  8.2  - 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  14.4  -  18.0  - 
Bavaria  13.9  -  14.1  - 
West Berlin  5.0  -  6.8  - 
East Berlin  -  6.9  -  4.1 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania  -  9.5  -  10.8 
Brandenburg  -  16.6  -  16.3 
Saxony-Anhalt  -  19.3  -  20.9 
Thuringia  -  18.2  -  20.5 
Regional unemployment rate  10.0  19.0  10.0  18.9 
Regional unemployment rate squared  107.4  364.9  108.8  360.9 
Number of previous unemployment spells  1.0  1.5  0.7  1.5 
Not employed before  21.5 11.9 33.5 22.2 
Part-time before  -  -  19.5  9 
Vocational Training before  10.6  12.8  12.3  21.5 
1st Quarter  37.2  33.5  39.4  36.8 
2nd Quarter  22.7  19.6  21.4  21.0 
3rd Quarter  22.1  23.4  22.2  24.0 
December  9.3  9.2  9.1  8.7 
 Table A3  Continued    
    Men  Women 
    West  East  West  East 
Baseline hazard (month 1)           
month 2     9.0  10.4  9.0  7,5 
month 3     7.7  8.5  7.8  6,8 
month 4     6.4  7.0  6.8  6,1 
months 5-6     10.6  11.1  11.5  10,6 
months 19-32  14.3  12.1  12.2  15.2 
months > 32     9.0  7.3  8.4  10,6 
UB-entitlement         
Not entitled to UB  30.0  20.7  35.5  30.6 
< 0 months     21.4  22.2  18.5  25,1 
0 months     2.0  2.1  1.8  2,2 
1 month     2.1  2.4  2.0  2,3 
2 months     2.2  2.6  2.2  2,5 
3-4 months     4.8  5.7  5.0  5,5 
5-6 months     5.6  6.3  5.8  5,6 
7-8 months     6.3  6.9  6.7  5,6 
9-12 months     13.0  14.3  13.1  10,1 
13-18 months  5.9  7.4  4.9  5.2 
Income replacement ratios (IRR)         
IRR × received UB  0.27  0.37  0.26  0.29 
(IRR × received UB)squared  0.19  0.28  0.20  0.23 
IRR ×received UA  0.13  0.17  0.12  0.19 
(IRR × received UA) squared  0.08  0.11  0.08  0.12 
Number of observations  21349  14882  17586  18445 
Number of spells  2247  1782  1791  1528 
Number of persons 
1451  972  1307  882 
Note:  Means of dummy variables are given in shares in percent. Means are averages over person months. 
Source:  German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP); waves 1995-2003). Table A4   Estimation results for other variables in the hazard rate model - men  
   West East 
  
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
-0.111  -1.17  -0.165  -1.736  25 <= Age < 35 
(-1,06)  (-4,93)***  (-1,52)  (-5,21) 
-0.376  -1.518  -0.462  -1.462  35 <= Age < 44 
(-2,88)**  (-5,5)***  (-3,87)  (-4,31) 
-0.803  -1.438  -0.604  -1.369  44 <= Age < 52 
(-5,32)***  (-4,65)***  (-4,61)  (-3,46) 
-1.026  -1.149  -0.747  -1.188  52 <= Age < 56 
(-4,99)***  (-3,13)**  (-4,32)  (-2,44) 
-2.252  -0.578  -1.314  -0.272  Age >= 56 
(-8,04)***  (-1,81)  (-6,89)  (-0,66) 
-0.424  -0.614  -  -  Foreigner 
(-4,78)***  (-3,48)***  -  - 
-0.474  0.371  -0.456  0.392  Disabled 
(-3,01)**  (1,79)  (-2,53)  (1,30) 
0.115  -0.203  0.180  0.298  Married 
(1,2)  (-1,06)  (2,02)  (1,13) 
-0.066  -0.061  0.010  -0.369  Children <= 6 years 
(-1,16)  (-0,41)  (0,14)  (-1,04) 
-0.192  -0.213  -0.391  0.645  Children <= 6 years * single 
(-0,73)  (-0,41)  (-1,08)  (1,03) 
0.369  0.381  0.224  -0.272  Spouse employed 
(3,47)***  (1,44)  (2,37)  (-0,82) 
-0.177  0.165  0.117  0.017  Earnings of spouse/1000 
(-1,77)  (0,69)  (0,86)  (0,01) 
0.056  0.073  0.098  0.177  Other household income/1000 
(1,77)  (1,44)  (2,40)  (2,55) 
-0.149  -0.568  0.160  -0.793  General elementary  
(-1,16)  (-2,28)*  (0,79)  (-2,69) 
0.184  -0.079  0.382  -0.398  Middle vocational 
(1,41)  (-0,34)  (2,07)  (-1,55) 
0.684  0.309  0.223  0.459  Vocational plus college 
(4,02)***  (0,75)  (0,73)  (0,74) 
0.749  0.309  0.441  0.064  Higher vocational 
(3,57)***  (0,76)  (1,94)  (0,13) 
0.374  0.026  0.475  -0.508  Higher Education 
(2,42)*  (0,08)  (2,14)  (-1,13) 
0.241  0.341  0.180  -0.406  Regional Unemployment Rates 
(2,37)*  (1,77)  (0,95)  (-1,29) 
-0.011  -0.014  -0.005  0.012  Reg. unempl. rate squared 
(-2,41)*  (-1,7)  (-0,96)  (1,39) 
0.052  -0.208  -0.035  -0.033  # unemployment spells in the past 
(1,86)  (-2,65)**  (-1,54)  (-0,48) 
0.195  -0.008  0.216  -0.021  Trained worker 
(2,12)*  (-0,04)  (2,94)  (-0,09) 
0.275  -0.414  0.251  -0.128  Foreman 
(2,19)*  (-1,62)  (2,11)  (-0,34) 
0.292  -0.066  -0.400  -1.760  Self-employed 
(1,27)  (-0,12)  (-1,63)  (-1,63) 
-0.438  0.27  -0.339  0.759  Not employed before 
(-4,97)***  (1,62)  (-3,27)  (3,48) 
Vocational training before  -0.272  0.149  -0.218  0.329 
  (-2,51)*  (0,68)  (-2,15)  (1,37) 
 Table A4   Continued   
   West  East 
  
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
Baseline Hazard         
0.121  0.264  0.531  1.232  Month 2 
(1,18)  (0.99)  (4.36)***  (3,93)*** 
0.338  0.447  0.644  0.969  Month 3 
(2,79)**  (1,56)  (4,62)***  (2,63)** 
0.181  0.49  0.699  0.899  Month 4 
(1,24)  (1,45)  (4,61)***  (2,27)* 
0.142  0.892  0.463  1.268  Months 5-6 
(1,06)  (3,24)**  (2,97)**  (3,37)*** 
0.000  0.138  0.387  1.106  Months 7-9 
(0.00)  (0,40)  (2,35)*  (2,77)** 
0.044  0.676  0.527  1.504  Months 10-12 
(0,28)  (2,14)*  (2,91)**  (3,84)*** 
-0.294  0.859  0.120  1.139  Months 13-18 
(-1,73)  (3,03)**  (0,59)  (2,48)* 
-0.478  0.66  -0.144  1.649  Months 19-32 
(-2,58)**  (2,12)*  (-0,61)  (4,11)*** 
-0.526  1.499  -0.488  2.144  Months > 32 
(-2,04)*  (4,32)***  (-1,60)  (4,46)*** 
-3.559  -6.323  -4.570  -3.063  Constant 
(-5,72)***  (-5,07)***  (-2,51)*  (-0,90) 
ε
1  -.404**  -1.046*** 
ε
2   0.673  1.875*** 
ε
3  --   0.243 
P(ε
1)   0.625   0.261 
P(ε
2)  0.375   0.057 
P(ε
3)  --  0.682 
Number of observations  21349  14882 
Number of spells  2247  1782  
Log likelihood  -6145.953  -4891.52 
Number of parameters  122  120 
Akaike criterion  12535.91  10023.041 
Notes:    Regional dummy variables and seasonal (quarterly) dummies are included in all regressions; t-values are given in parantheses; * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 Table A5   Estimation results for other variables in the hazard rate model - women  
   West  East 
  
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
-0.156  -0.434  -0.730  -0.803  25 <= Age < 35 
(-1.39)  (-2.19)*  (-4.71)***  (-2.78)** 
-0.364  -1.030  -0.991  -1.68  35 <= Age < 44 
(-2.99)**  (-4.61)***  (-5.97)***  (-5.36)*** 
-0.663  -1.249  -1.183  -1.592  44 <= Age < 52 
(-4.25)***  (-4.79)***  (-6.49)***  (-4.74)*** 
-1.024  -1.327  -1.58  -1.991  52 <= Age < 56 
(-4.22)***  (-4.03)***  (-7.06)***  (-4.29)*** 
-2.448  -0.890  -2.558  -1.232  Age >= 56 
(-6.88)***  (-2.96)**  (-8.93)***  (-3.80)*** 
-0.477  -0.499  -  -  Foreigner 
(-4.32)***  (-3.01)**  -  - 
-0.462  0.456  0.197  0.952  Disabled 
(-2.31)*  (1.85)  (0.68)  (2.34)* 
-0.225  0.437  0.064  0.466  Married 
(-2.19)*  (2.51)*  (0.56)  (2.27)* 
-0.279  0.207  -0.304  -0.117  Children <= 6 years 
(-3.13)**  (1.77)  (-2.85)**  (-0.63) 
-0.533  -0.378  0.287  -0.042  Children <= 6 years * single 
(-2.51)*  (-1.23)  (1.25)  (-0.10) 
0.138  0.072  0.098  -0.017  Spouse employed 
(1.05)  (0.37)  (0.78)  (-0.09) 
-0.011  -0.045  0.032  0.015  Earnings of spouse/1000 
(-0.17)  (-0.49)  (0.34)  (0.10) 
0.049  0.011  0.160  0.223  Other household income/1000 
(1.35)  (0.19)  (2.90)**  (2.30)* 
0.086  -0.218  0.607  0.023  General elementary  
(0.49)  (-1.02)  (1.89)  (0.07) 
0.470  -0.187  0.741  0.263  Middle vocational 
(2.73)**  (-0.85)  (2.59)**  (0.87) 
0.587  0.321  0.986  -0.731  Vocational plus college 
(2.85)**  (1.00)  (2.73)**  (-0.96) 
0.305  -0.263  1.391  0.569  Higher vocational 
(1.29)  (-0.73)  (3.88)***  (1.14) 
0.682  -0.316  1.306  0.733  Higher education 
(3.37)***  (-1.05)  (4.15)***  (1.99)* 
0.013  -0.028  -0.142  -0.386  Regional unemployment rates 
(0.10)  (-0.16)  (-0.96)  (-1.23) 
-0.001  0.003  0.003  0.011  Reg. Unempl. Rate squared 
(-0.23)  (0.39)  (0.75)  (1.32) 
0.036  0.013  0.006  -0.139  # unemployment spells in the past 
(0.96)  (0.20)  (0.16)  (-1.95) 
0.051  -0.474  0.094  0.285  Trained worker 
(0.26)  (-1.09)  (0.69)  (1.28) 
0.128  0.338  0.575  1.112  Foreman 
(0.70)  (1.20)  (3.02)**  (3.48)*** 
0.079  -0.102  -0.162  -0.357  Self-employed 
(0.36)  (-0.17)  (-0.67)  (-0.52) 
-0.59  -0.232  -0.552  0.445  Not employed before 
(-5.72)***  (-1.37)  (-4.43)***  (2.16)* 
-0.178  -0.399  -0.159  0.164  Vocational training before 
(-1.57)  (-1.65)  (-1.46)  (0.80) Table A5   Continued   
   West  East 
  
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
Employment  Out-of-the- 
labour-force 
Baseline Hazard             
0.210  0.174  -0.025  1.160  Month 2 
(1.71)  (0.57)  (-0.17)  (3.12)** 
0.188  0.046  -0.028  1.333  Month 3 
(1.40)  (0.14)  (-0.19)  (3.42)*** 
0.043  0.389  0.068  0.784  Month 4 
(0.27)  (1.15)  (0.37)  (1.73) 
-0.151  0.336  0.207  1.053  Months 5-6 
(-1.05)  (1.10)  (1.42)  (2.60)** 
0.155  0.400  0.076  1.664  Months 7-9 
(1.10)  (1.35)  -0.48)  (4.42)*** 
-0.029  1.245  0.256  1.17  Months 10-12 
(-0.18)  (4.37)***  (1.49)  (2.89)** 
-0.058  1.140  0.074  0.906  Months 13-18 
(-0.32)  (3.81)***  (0.40)  (2.21)* 
-0.412  0.929  -0.159  1.541  Months 19-32 
(-1.68)  (2.90)**  (-0.76)  (3.94)*** 
-0.875  0.956  -0.290  2.004  Months > 32 
(-2.34)*  (2.40)*  (-0.92)  (4.69)*** 
-2.484  -3.315  -1.131  -2.178  Constant 
(-3.14)**  (-2.64)**  (-0.81)  (-0.71) 
ε
1  -.7597*  -2.66*** 
ε
2  0.287  1.02*** 
ε
3   --  -0.148 
P(ε
1)  0.274  0.042 
P(ε
2)  0.726  0.216 
P(ε
3)   --  0.742 
Number of observations  17586  18445 
Number of spells  1791  1528 
Log likelihood  -5078.174  -4735.3154 
Number of parameters  124  122 
Akaike criterion  10404.35  9714.6308  
 
Table A6   Simulated effects of policy reform on survival rates (in %) after 6. 12 … months of unemployment. men  
  West Germany  East Germany 







6  12  18  24  6  12  18  24  6  12  18  24  6  12  18  24 
45 (18 → 12)  average  65  38  27  9  55  35  10  3  60  32  19  4  54  26  6  1 




No UA and no 
UB II; 
Couple. no 
children  57 (32 →  18)  average  89  81  69  58  84  69  59  33  79  61  48  29  74  45  27  5 
low  46  25  18  13  57  29  20  14  40 (12 →  12) 
high 
46  25  18  13 
46  25  16  11 
57  29  20  14 
57  29  18  12 
low  58  38  30  24  61  35  24  18  45 (18 →  12) 
high 
67  41  30  24 
58  38  28  22 
67  41  26  19 
61  35  23  16 
low  63  45  36  30  66  39  29  22  52 (24 →  12) 
high 
76  56  40  31 
63  45  34  27 
74  52  37  25 
66  39  27  20 






B  UA and UB II; 
Single. no 
children 
57 (32 →  18) 
high 
90  81  68  56 
84  69  58  50 
83  68  56  39 
79  54  37  26 
low  45  24  17  12  50  23  14  9 
40 (12 →  12) 
high 
45  24  16  12 
45  24  16  12 
50  23  14  9 
50  23  14  9 
low  57  37  29  24  55  27  18  13 
45 (18 →  12) 
high 
66  41  29  23 
57  37  29  23 
60  33  20  13 
55  27  18  12 
low  63  44  35  30  60  32  23  16 
52 (24 →  12) 
high 
76  56  40  31 
63  44  35  29 
68  44  30  19 
60  32  22  16 







UA and UB II; 
Couple. 1 
child 
57 (32 →  18) 
high 
90  82  70  60 
85  71  61  55 
80  63  50  34 
75  49  33  24 
Source:  Simulations based on estimation results in Table A4.  
 
Table A7   Simulated effects of policy reform on survival rates (in %) after 6. 12 … months of unemployment. women  
  West Germany  East Germany 







6  12  18  24  6  12  18  24  6  12  18  24  6  12  18  24 
45 (18 →  12)  average  72  44  26  6  67  40  6  1  65  46  29  10  72  44  13  5 




No UA and no 
UB II; 
Couple. no 
children  57 (32 →  18)  average  89  73  58  45  88  66  43  10  92  83  73  67  88  79  69  47 
low  55  28  19  14  70  40  26  19  40 (12 → 12) 
high 
55  28  19  14 
55  28  17  12 
70  40  26  19 
70  40  25  17 
low  64  38  28  23  74  47  33  25  45 (18 → 12) 
high 
69  41  25  20 
64  38  26  19 
67  48  32  24 
74  47  31  22 
low  72  49  39  33  81  59  47  38  52 (24 → 12) 
high 
83  60  42  31 
72  49  36  29 
82  60  49  39 
81  59  45  36 






B  UA and UB II; 
Single. no 
children 
57 (32 → 18) 
high 
91  79  66  55 
90  72  53  47 
93  84  75  70 
89  81  72  65 
low  64  35  26  21  75  48  34  26 
40 (12 → 12) 
high 
64  35  25  20 
64  35  25  20 
75  48  34  26 
75  48  34  26 
low  71  44  35  29  78  54  41  32 
45 (18 → 12) 
high 
76  49  29  24 
71  44  34  29 
72  55  40  31 
78  54  40  32 
low  77  52  43  38  85  66  54  46 
52 (24 → 12) 
high 
85  65  45  31 
77  52  43  37 
85  67  56  47 
85  66  54  46 







UA and UB II; 
Couple. 1 
child 
57 (32 → 18) 
high 
88  70  54  40 
88  64  38  34 
94  86  79  74 
91  84  76  70 
Source:  Simulations based on estimation results in Table A5. 
 
 